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disputes is concerned, New York remains in a transitional stage.
Perhaps legislative action would be an appropriate solution.
163
DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW
DRL 170(5): Family court order of protection held to be a sufficient
predicate for a nonfault divorce.
Section 170(5) of the Domestic Relations Law1 64 reflects the
recent liberalization of divorce law in New York.16 5 Under this
provision, if a "husband and wife have lived apart pursuant to a
decree or judgment of separation for a period of one or more years,' 66
either party to the marriage 67 may, regardless of fault,168 procure
163 See id. at n.4, 324 N.E.2d at n.4, 364 N.Y.S.2d at n.4. Professor Sedler urges that the
concept of standing be abandoned completely, as it "is of little real signifiance [sic]." Sedler,
Standing, Justiciability, and All That: A Behavioral Analysis, 25 VAND. L. REv. 479, 511 (1972).
On the other hand, Professor Jaffe, in several articles, posits that standing should be not of
right but within the discretion of the court. He contends that the developing relaxed
standards for standing cause certain risks and dangers for the administrative process. See
Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARV. L. REv. 633, 638 (1971); Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial
Review: Private Actions, 75 id. 255, 286-87, 302-05 (1961).
164 DRL 170(5) provides that a divorce should be granted if:
The husband and wife have lived apart pursuant to a decree or judgment of
separation for a period of one or more years after the granting of such decree or
judgment, and satisfactory proof has been submitted by the plaintiff that he or she
has substantially performed all the terms and conditions of such decree or judg-
ment.
165 Prior to the enactment of the Divorce Reform Law iIi 1966, ch. 254, [1966] N.Y.
Laws 833, the only ground for divorce in New York was adultery by the spouse against
whom the action was brought. Frequently, where such a ground did not legitimately exist,
parties seeking to dissolve their marriage would offer perjured testimony to procure a
divorce. See Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L. REv. 32 (1966).
Currently, in New York, there exist six different grounds for a divorce, see DRL 170, two of
which are commonly referred to as no-fault grounds. See Atkins, The Developing Divorce
Reform Law, 45 N.Y. ST. B.J. 545 (1973); Branstein, No-Fault Divorce, Alimony, and Property
Settlement, id. 241 (1973).
166 DRL 170(5) (emphasis added). The only other requirement of § 170(5) is that the
plaintiff submit satisfactory proof that he or she has substantially complied with all the
conditions of the separation decree or judgment. Id. Courts have been quite liberal in
accepting substantial compliance, often to the extent of affording a plaintiff the opportunity
to remedy any unsatisfactory performance. See, e.g., Vitale v. Vitale, 37 App. Div. 2d 963,
964, 327 N.Y.S.2d 89, 90 (2d Dep't 1971); Rubin v. Rubin, 35 App. Div. 2d 460, 461, 317
N.Y.S.2d 571, 573 (4th Dep't 1971).
1617 An early and particularly vexing issue encountered in the application of DRL 170(5)
was whether that section should be available to the party adjudicated guilty when the prior
separation decree was obtained. See, e.g., Church v. Church, 58 Misc. 2d 753, 755, 296
N.Y.S.2d 716, 718 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1968) (divorce action pursuant to § 170(5)
may not be maintained by a guilty spouse); Frishman v. Frishman, 58 Misc. 2d 208, 210, 295
N.Y.S.2d 70, 72 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1968) (either guilty or innocent spouse may procure
a divorce under § 170(5)). The principal objection to permitting a divorce in favor of a
"guilty" spouse was that it would deprive the innocent, and often less financially able, spouse
of economic benefits which would otherwise accrue from the marital status, viz, property
rights; inheritance rights; social security, medical, and retirement benefits; etc. See Hendel v.
Hendel, 59 Misc. 2d 770, 300 N.Y.S.2d 350 (Sup. CL N.Y. County 1969), modified, 44 App.
Div. 2d 532, 353 N.Y.S.2d 454 (lst Dep't 1974) (mem.).
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a divorce. Although the statute appears unambiguous on its face,
confusion has arisen as to the type of judicial pronouncement
which will constitute a "decree or judgment of separation." In
Wechter v. Wechter, 169 the Supreme Court, Kings County, adopting a
liberal interpretation of the statutory language, held that a family
court order of protection 17 0 constitutes a sufficient predicate upon
which to grant a DRL 170(5) divorce.
In Wechter, an action for divorce, the defendant wife had, in a
prior support proceeding in the family court,1 1 obtained an order
of support and an order of protection requiring the parties to
remain apart for one year. Having lived apart from the defendant
in compliance with the order of protection for approximately seven
years, plaintiff husband filed for divorce. In opposition, defendant
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals, in Gleason v. Gleason, 26 N.Y.2d 28, 35, 256
N.E.2d 513, 516, 308 N.Y.S.2d 347, 351 (1970), established that the guilt or innocence of the
party seeking to convert the separation decree into a divorce is irrelevant. The Court further
noted that if the loss of important rights by the innocent party "is thought to occasion
economic inequity .... redress or alleviation must be left to the Legislature." Id. at 43, 256
N.E.2d at 521, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 357. Indeed, by a recent amendment to DRL 170, ch. 1047,
§ 170(7), [1974] N.Y. Laws 2692 (codified at DRL 170-a), the legislature has attempted to-
remedy this problem. Under this new provision a spouse may institute a proceeding to
recover the value of certain rights lost as the result of a divorce decree. Absent intervening
circumstances which render such an award inequitable, the interest of the plaintiff in this
action is to be calculated "as if the death of the defendant had immediately antedated the
divorce." DRL 170-a(b). Hopefully, with the aid of this provision, courts will be able to grant
a divorce pursuant to § 170(5) with less fear of an inequitable distribution of the marital
assets.
1'" Four of the six grounds for divorce in New York are predicated upon a finding of
marital fault. See DRL 170(l)-(4). An action for divorce may be instituted against a spouse
who is guilty of cruel and inhuman treatment, abandonment for one or more years,
imprisonment for three or more consecutive years, or adultery. Section 170(5), although
commonly referred to as one of the two nonfault grounds for divorce in New York, also
requires a finding of fault in the first instance since a judicial decree or judgment of
separation, the apparent prerequisite for a § 170(5) divorce, may only be granted upon
evidence of cruel and inhuman treatment, abandonment, neglect of wife, adultery, or
confinement in prison for three or more consecutive years. DRL 200. The only true nonfault
ground for divorce, therefore, is contained in subdivision six of § 170. This provision
permits parties who have lived apart for at least one year pursuant to either a written
separation agreement or a memorandum executed according to certain formal requirements
to maintain an action for divorce.
169 81 Misc. 2d 821, 366 N.Y.S.2d 996 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1975) (mem.) (Heller, J.).
170 N.Y. FAMILY CT. AcT § 842 (McKinney Supp. 1974). Authority to grant an order of
protection is vested in the family court. Id. § 841(d). The order typically prescribes condi-
tions of behavior to be observed by the petitioner or respondent spouse and can extend for
as long as a year. Id. § 842. For example, the court may order one spouse "to stay away from
the home, the other spouse or the child." Id. § 842(a). As a general matter, a protection
order is granted to stabilize a dangerous condition and to protect the safety of persons and
property. See Capelli v. Capelli, 73 Misc. 2d 431, 433, 341 N.Y.S.2d 798, 800 (Family Ct.
Rockland County), rev'd, 42 App. Div. 2d 905, 347 N.Y.S.2d 601 (2d Dep't 1973). Failure to
comply with an order of protection may result in that spouse's commitment to jail for a term
not in excess of six months. N.Y. FAMILY CT. AcT § 846 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
171 Support proceedings are under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the family court.
See N.Y. FAMILY CT. AcT §§ 411 et seq. (McKinney 1963).
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moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of
action.'7 2 The Wechter court, however, found that the order of
protection fully satisfied the requirements for a conversion divorce
pursuant to DRL 170(5) and thereupon denied defendant's motion
to dismiss.17 3
The court considered the legislative intent behind the enact-
ment of section 170(5) especially relevant to its determination. As
particularly helpful in this regard, Wechter cited the "keystone"
Court of Appeals decision, Gleason v. Gleason. 114 In passing upon
the retroactive application of section 170(5) specifically at issue in
that case, 17 5 the Gleason Court discussed in depth the purpose and
operation of this new nonfault ground for divorce. According to
the Court of Appeals
[t]he vital and operative fact is that the parties have actually lived
apart .... The real purpose of this nonfault provision was, as
noted, to sanction divorce on grounds unrelated to misconduct.
The decree is simply intended as evidence of the authenticity and
reality of the separation. 17 6
Relying upon Gleason, the Wechter court concluded that the legisla-
ture's purpose in requiring a "decree or judgment of separation"
was merely to insure that there be documentary evidence of the
fact of separation. 177 To infer that the legislature further intended
172 In support of her motion, the defendant argued, inter alia, that an order of the
family court had no effect upon the marital status of the parties and therefore could not
serve as a basis for divorce under DRL 170(5). 81 Misc. 2d at 822, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 996.
17Id. at 825-26, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 999-1000. The sole issue in Wechter was whether the
order of protection constituted a sufficient predicate for a § 170(5) divorce. The court never
reached the question of whether a divorce should be granted because a factual determina-
tion on the issue of plaintiff's compliance with the order of the family court was necessary.
Id. at 825, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 1000.
174 26 N.Y.2d 28, 256 N.E.2d 513, 308 N.Y.S.2d 347 (1970).
175 Prior to Gleason, the retroactive application of § 170(5) and the attendant due process
implications had been a major source of litigation. Since a party who requested a separation
decree prior to the enactment of DRL 170(5) had no reason to contemplate its possible use
as grounds for divorce, it was argued that such a use would deprive that party of valuable
property rights without the requisite notice. Id. at 40, 256 N.E.2d at 519, 308 N.Y.S.2d at
355. In rejecting this argument, the Gleason Court reasoned that marital rights are merely
contigent rights which may be taken away by the legislature before they vest. Id.
176Id. at 35, 256 N.E.2d at 516, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 351. The Gleason Court further
remarked:
Reasonably and sensibly read, the statute, as a whole, points the construction that all
that has to be proved is that there is some kind of formal document of separation
.... The function of the decree, as we already noted, is merely to authenticate the
fact of separation.
Id. at 37, 256 N.E.2d at 517, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 353.
177 81 Misc. 2d at 825, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 999. A number of courts have relied upon
Gleason's liberal construction of legislative intent to sustain actions for divorce under DRL
170(6), i.e. conversion divorces based upon separation agreements, where all the formal
statutory requirements had not been observed. See, e.g., Markowitz v. Markowitz, 77 Misc. 2d
586, 587-88, 353 N.Y.S.2d 872, 874-75 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1974); Littlejohns v.
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to require a specific type of proof would, in the court's opinion,
"emphasize form over substance and place undue stress upon the
instrument."'17 8 Having found no significant distinctions between
the operative provisions of a separation decree and a protection
order, 179 the court determined that use of either as proof of sep-
aration would further the legislative objective of preventing fraud
and collusion.' 80
The social undesirability of compelling couples to remain to-
gether under the guise of a conjugal relationship which is in fact
meaningless has generally been conceded.' 81 In this regard, the
result achieved in Wechter is an equitable one.'8 2 Nevertheless, the
court appears to have adopted a broader construction of the statute
than its language warrants.' 83 The provisions of DRL 170(5) are
Littlejohns, 76 Misc. 2d 82, 87, 349 N.Y.S.2d 462, 468 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1972), aff'd, 42
App. Div. 2d 957, 348 N.Y.S.2d 959 (lst Dep't 1973); Martin v. Martin, 63 Misc. 2d 530,
533, 312 N.Y.S.2d 520, 523 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1970). Emphasizing the fact of physical
separation rather than the torm of proof, these courts have been remarkably broad in their
interpretation of § 170(6).
178 81 Misc. 2d at 825, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 999.
179 The family court order at issue in Wechter required that the husband live apart from
his wife and support his family. A further provision granted him limited child visitation
rights. Justice Heller noted that these are the essential features of a separation decree. Id.
,80 Id. at 825, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 999-1000. Indeed, the committee rewriting New York's
matrimonial laws expressly stated that one of its objectives was to prevent fraudulently
procured divorces. REPORT OF THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON MATRIMONIAL
AND FAMILY LAws, 1966 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 8, at 21-23.
181 See, e.g., Finlay, Reluctant, But Inevitable: The Retreat of Matrimonial Fault, 38 MODERN
L. REv. 153 (1975); Foster & Freed, Living Apart as a Ground for Divorce, 153 N.Y.L.J. 94, May
17, 1965, at I, col. 4; Comment, No-Fault Divorce: A Proposal for Mississippi, 45 Miss. L.J. 179
(1974); Note, The Case for No-Fault Divorce, 10 TULSA L. REv. 427 (1975); Note, Domes-
tic Relations: Incompatibility Divorce in Kansas -A Movement Toward No-Fault Divorce, 14
WASHBURN L.J. 349 (1975). See also notes 192-93 and accompanying text infra.1
2 The Wechter court was obviously influenced by the overwhelming evidence that a
viable marriage no longer existed. In 1967, after 15 years of marital difficulties, the husband
in Wechter procured a unilateral Mexican divorce. Shortly thereafter, he remarried and at
the time of this action was living with his new "spouse." In addition, before his wife obtained
a support order from the family court, he refused to provide his family with any financial
support whatsoever. 81 Misc. 2d at 822, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 997. Nevertheless, the defendant
wife argued that public policy would not be served by permitting the use of an order of
protection as grounds for a § 170(5) conversion divorce. She feared that this would encour-
age a husband, desirous of obtaining a divorce, to breach his obligation of support, hoping
that his wife would seek an order of support and an order of protection, and discourage a
wife, who might not want that divorce, from seeking judicial protection. Id. at 823, 366
N.Y.S.2d at 997. The Wechter court disposed of this argument by noting that "[tihere is no
provision in the law that requires wives.., to seek orders of protection in the Family Court
when seeking an order of supporL" Id. at 825-26, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 1000.
13 In Peck v. Peck, 78 Misc. 2d 207, 209, 356 N.Y.S.2d 517, 519 (Sup. CL Monroe
County 1974), the Supreme Court, Monroe County, refused to give the statute more than a
literal interpretation, stating that "[nleither the Court of Appeals [in Gleason] nor the
legislature intended that a no-fault divorce could be based upon any kind of formal docu-
ment of separation." Id. at 209, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 519 (emphasis in original). Consequently,
the court refused to grant a divorce predicated upon an order and judgment - that the
husband make mortgage payments and pay taxes on the couple's residence -issued in a
previous unsuccessful divorce action.
1975]
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clear and specific. The statute requires a "decree or judgment of
separation." Had the legislature intended that any kind of judicial
order requiring the parties to live separate and apart satisfy the
requirements of the statute, it could have easily so stated. Absent
any authorization in the legislative history it should not be assumed
that the failure to include family court orders or other types of
judicial orders was the result of legislative oversight.
Prior case law seems to reflect a preference for a narrow
reading of the statute. In Becker v. Becker,'8 4 for example, the
Appellate Division, Second Department, held that an existing
judgment resembling a separation decree 85 was insufficient to
satisfy the requirements of 170(5),186 emphasizing that "nothing
less than a judicial decree of separation [may] be the antecedent of
a divorce decree under that subdivision."'8 7 It can certainly be
argued that an order of the family court, which is not binding on
the supreme court and has no effect on the marital status of the
parties,18 8 is something less than a judgment or decree of separa-
tion. The Supreme Court, Nassau County, in Liebling v. Liebling,189
similarly refused to permit a judgment awarding the defendant
exclusive possession of the marital home to serve as a basis for
divorce under section 170(5). To grant the divorce in this instance
would, in the court's opinion,
do violence to the limitations imposed by the Legislature and [in
effect] provide a seventh ground for divorce which might in-
dude, if the analogy be permitted, an order of protection by the
Family Court.1 90
184 44 App. Div. 2d 676, 353 N.Y.S.2d 796 (2d Dep't 1974) (mem.), modifying 72 Misc. 2d
64, 338 N.Y.S.2d 376 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1972).
185 The wife was awarded exclusive possession of the marital home, child custody, and
support, while the husband was granted visitation rights. A separation decree, however, was
specifically denied. Id. at 676, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 797.
186 In modifying the position of the lower court, which granted a divorce under both
DRL 170(5) and DRL 170(1), the appellate court in Becker took issue with the trial court's
position that the fact of separation is of ultimate importance. The appellate court insisted
that the language of DRL 170(5) be strictly construed:
[W]e cannot agree with Special Term's finding that the underlying 1965 judgment,
which specifically denied a separation decree while awarding custody, support and
visitation, can be construed to satisfy the clear requirements of subdivision (5) of
section 170 of the Domestic Relations Law that nothing less than ajudicial decree of
separation be the antecedent of a divorce decree under that subdivision.
44 App. Div. 2d at 676-77, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 797. The grant of the divorce under section
170(1), however, was affirmed. Id.
1817 44 App. Div. 2d at 676, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 797.188 See Loomis v. Loomis, 288 N.Y. 222, 224, 42 N.E.2d 495, 496 (1942); accord, Shulsky
v. Shulsky, 63 Misc. 2d 642, 644-45, 312 N.Y.S.2d 944, 946-47 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1970);
Small v. Small, 77 Misc. 2d 1032, 1035, 355 N.Y.S.2d 545, 547 (Family Ct. Queens County
1974).
189 76 Misc. 2d 465, 352 N.Y.S.2d 758 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1973).
19°Id. at 468, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 761.
[Vol. 50:179
1975] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
Both Becker and Liebling were conspicuously absent from Justice
Heller's opinion in Wechter.' 9'
Unquestionably, the Wechter decision is in accord with both the
liberal attitude expressed by the Court of Appeals in Gleason' 92 and
societal views recognizing divorce as a necessary and desirable
social institution. 193 Its apparent inconsistency with a literal reading
of the statute in issue and precedent such as Becker and Liebling,
however, serves only to make future determinations of what consti-
tutes a valid predicate for divorce under DRL 170(5) unpredicta-
ble. Since it appears that the divorce laws in New York require
further liberalization in order to adequately reflect social attitudes,
it is hoped that the legislature' 94 will act quickly in this regard and
clarify the confusion generated by conflicting judicial decisions.
Editor's Note. As The Survey goes to print, Wechter has been
reversed on appeal. 174 N.Y.L.J. 112, Dec. 11, 1975, at 11, col. 2
(App. Div. 2d Dep't). Adhering to a literal interpretation of the
statutory language, the Appellate Division, Second Department,
held that "[n]othing less than a judicial judgment of sparation [sic]
can be the basis for a divorce under the clear requirements of
subdivision (5) of section 170 of the Domestic Relations Law ......
"I' Another relevant decision not cited by the Wechter court is Harris v. Harris, 36 App.
Div. 2d 594, 318 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1st Dep't 1971), rev'g mem. 164 N.Y.L.J. 10, July 15, 1970, at
10, col. I (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County). The plaintiff in that case sought a divorce based on a New
Jersey 'judgment of separate maintenance." Ruling that the New Jersey judgment was
similar to a family court order of support in New York and that such judgment had no effect
on the marital status of the parties, the trial court dismissed the action. See 36 App. Div. 2d
at 594, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 362. Although it reversed the decision below, the Appellate Division,
First Department, did not take issue with the trial court's conclusion that an order of the
family court would not be a sufficient ground for a divorce under DRL 170(5). Instead, the
appellate court held that the New Jersey judgment was the equivalent of a separation decree
in New York. Id. at 595, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 363.
192 The Gleason Court found
[i]mplicit in the statutory scheme.., the legislative recognition that it is socially and
morally undesirable to compel couples to a dead marriage to retain an illusory and
deceptive status and that the best interests not only of the parties but of society itself
will be furthered by enabling them "to extricate themselves from a state of marital
limbo."
26 N.Y.2d at 35, 256 N.E.2d at 516, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 351, quoting Adelman v. Adelman, 58
Misc. 2d 803, 805, 296 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1003 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1969).
"
3 See Sassower, No-Fault Divorce and Women's Property Rights: A Rebuttal, 45 N.Y. ST. B.J.
485, 487-88 (1973). The author contends that the acceptance of no-fault divorce would lead
to better marriages because dead marriages could be easily dissolved and the parties free to
start anew in a wiser marriage.
In his opinion in Wechter, Justice Heller strongly urged that New York adopt a more
liberal and absolute form of no-fault divorce. Given society's widespread acceptance of
divorce, the justice observed that "[d]issolution of a marriage should not involve a war
between the parties in the courtroom." 81 Misc. 2d at 827, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 1001.
194 As noted in Nitschke v. Nitschke, 66 Misc. 2d 435, 438, 321 N.Y.S.2d 246, 249 (Sup.
Ct. Queens County 1971) (wife's open court request that the husband vacate the marital
premises insufficient predicate for § 170(5) divorce), "the courts have gone as far as they
may go and it is now up to the legislature to remedy the problems."
